This paper examines play in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented with noise and intentions are perfectly observable, and compares it to play in cases where intentions are not observed. We find that the effect of directly observing intentions varies with the strategic incentives of the game: as theory predicts, observing intentions leads to more cooperation, especially if these observations support a cooperative equilibrium that would not otherwise be present. Moreover when there is a high return to cooperation, some subjects are tolerant, using intentions to forgive accidental defections while not punishing partners who meant to defect but cooperated by accident. Conversely, when there is a low return to cooperation, some subjects are punitive: outcomes are used to punish accidental defections, but accidental cooperation is not punished. Observing intentions leads subjects to use simpler lowermemory strategies; this suggests that the more complex cooperative strategies seen in games where intentions are not observable arise from an attempt to infer intentions.
Introduction
This paper studies reciprocal altruism in the setting of infinitely repeated games where the intended actions are implemented with error, so that the actions played are only a noisy signal of what was intended. The possibility of error is pervasive in social interactions, and many if not most of these interactions do not have a fixed and known termination date. The resulting imperfect public monitoring has received a large amount of attention in the theoretical literature on infinitely repeated games (e.g. Abreu et al. 1990 , Green and Porter 1984 , Fudenberg et al. 1994 , Radner et al. 1986 ), but only a handful of experimental studies explore infinitely repeated games with errors (e.g. Aoyagi and Frechette 2009 , Bigoni et al. 2012 , Fudenberg et al. 2012 , Aoyagi et al. 2013 ).
Our setup differs from those of past studies of repeated games in considering the effect of players directly observing the intended actions of their opponents in addition to the realized ones.
This sort of information is available in some real-world settings, for example compensation for hedge fund managers where both the positions taken and the actual outcomes are observable, or in a homicide when it is clear that the accused shot the victim -here the legal system pays attention to both intentions and outcomes, differentiating between manslaughter and various levels of murder. In other settings players do not observe each other's intended actions, as in repeated partnerships subject to moral hazard. From a theoretical standpoint the impact of observing intentions is clear: the highest equilibrium payoff can be obtained with strategies that completely ignore the realized outcomes and condition only on intended play, and moreover this best equilibrium is the same as when actions are implemented without error. In principle games with observed intentions are distinct from games where intentions are not observed, so people might use totally different strategies in each. The empirical evidence on observing intentions in other, related, settings suggests that when players can observe both intentions and outcomes that are in conflict, they pay attention to both, but this literature examines only one-shot games and repeated games with a known fixed final period, so that cooperation is not a persistent equilibrium phenomenon.
1 Thus the question of whether and how people use intentions data in 1 Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) explore cooperation in the one-shot and finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma where actions are implemented without noise and are perfectly observable but where payoffs are either a deterministic or stochastic function of the actions played; since the end period is common knowledge, there is a substantial last-period effect in each interaction (as in Kunreuther et al. 2009 who also explore random payoffs). They find that the outcome due to the random shock in the previous period matters for the decision to cooperate this repeated games is an open empirical question, as is the effect of this data on the level of cooperation.
To begin to understand this issue, we studied the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with error. Our main goals are to understand when and how subjects use data on intentions and outcomes, and whether allowing intentions to be observed would result in significantly more cooperation compared to either a setting with error when intentions are not observed or one in which error is not present so the actions themselves reveal the intentions. We present evidence from two different payoff specifications for a repeated prisoner's dilemma, with stage game actions "Cooperate" ("C") and "Defect" ("D") (neutral language was used in the experiment itself). The difference in specifications was the benefit that playing "C" gives to the other player: In the "cooperative" treatment this benefit was high, so there is a lot of cooperative play equilibrium even in a game with errors and unobserved intentions, while in the "non-cooperative" treatment the return to C is low enough that the only equilibrium with unobserved intentions is to always defect. The treatments had a continuation probability of 7/8 and an error rate of 1/8, and intentions were observable; as controls, we also considered the same games but with intentions unobserved, and the games without exogenously imposed error (where the observed action corresponds to the intended one).
Summary of results
We use two different methods to analyze the data: a structural estimation of the distribution of strategies using the "structural frequency estimation method" (SFEM) of Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) , and a descriptive analysis that relates play in a given period of an interaction to the opponent's intention and action in the period before (which implicitly assumes subjects use strategies that mostly depend on that information), Both methods show that, consistent with theory, most subjects condition almost exclusively on intentions. In our descriptive analysis, the effect of opponent's intention is dramatically larger than that of the period, but less so than whether the other player cooperated or defected in the previous period. Charness and Levine (2007) , Cushman et al. (2009) and Schächtele et al. (2011) study one-shot games where intentions and outcomes can be in conflict and can either be rewarded or punished. Papers such as Blount (1995) , Brandts and Solà (2001) , Andreoni et al. (2002) , Falk et al. (2003) , McCabe et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2008) either compare how subjects respond to random offers versus human ones or vary the strategy space of one player and study its impact on the response of the other player; in these papers intentions and outcomes are not in conflict. Ambrus and Greiner (2012) study imperfect public monitoring in a finitely repeated public goods game with costly punishment.
actual outcome. And in the strategy estimation, more than 2/3s of subjects use strategies which do not condition on outcomes.
To the extent that subjects do condition on outcomes, interestingly, they do so in different ways depending on the payoff specification. In the treatment where there is less of an incentive to cooperate, some people (about 15%) were punitive in treating both accidental cooperation (meant to play D but played C) and accidental defection (meant to play C but played D) as defection; only when the partner both intended to play C and actually did so was this treated as cooperation. This behavior was not observed in the treatment with high returns to cooperation, where instead some people (about 19%) were tolerant in that they only retaliated against intentional defections -these subjects forgave both accidental D's (meant to play C but played D) as well as accidental C's (meant to played D but played C). Thus the "punitive" subjects in the non-cooperative treatment used realized outcomes to punish cooperators when they defected by accident, while in the cooperative treatment "tolerant" subjects used the realized outcomes to forgive defectors when they accidentally cooperated.
By conditioning largely on intentions, subjects were able to achieve high levels of cooperation in both payoff specifications. Compared with the controls in which intentions were unobservable, revealing intentions lead to significantly more cooperation. Interestingly, this increase in cooperation was not associated with more leniency (overlooking an opponent's first defection) but instead with an increase in simple strategies that conditioned on at most the previous period. This suggests that many of the longer memory strategies seen in Fudenberg et al. (2012) were the result of subjects trying to infer the intentions of their opponent, either because doing so leads to higher monetary payoffs or because preferences depend on the intentions of others.
Finally, we compare play when intentions are observable to play in games where there are no errors. 2 We find that not only does revealing intentions increase cooperation compared to games where intentions are unobservable, but it successfully moves cooperation levels all the way back up to what is observed in the absence of errors. Furthermore, when the returns to cooperation are low we actually observe somewhat more cooperation when intentions are 2 Previous work on infinitely repeated games without errors has shown that subjects learn to cooperate, as long as the returns on cooperation are large enough relative to the continuation probability (Dal Bó 2005 , Dreber et al. 2008 , Dal Bó & Frechette 2011 , Fudenberg et al. 2012 . Furthermore, cooperation is significantly higher without errors compared to the case with errors where intentions are unobservable (Fudenberg et al. 2012) .
observable compared to no error. This is due to some increase in leniency: perhaps the presence of exogenously imposed errors primes subjects to consider the possibility of actual endogenous trembling hands in their opponents.
Experimental Design and Empirical Questions
The infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is induced by having a known constant probability of that the interaction will continue between two players following each period; with probability 1-δ, the interaction ends and subjects are informed that they have been re-matched with a new partner. In the main treatment, there is also a known constant error probability of E=1/8 that an intended move is changed to the opposite move. In this "observed intentions" treatment, subjects were informed of the intended action of the other player, the other player's realized action, and whether their own move has been changed (i.e. when they make an error). We also had an "unobserved intentions" control, where subjects were told their own realized action and the realized action of the other player but not the other player's intended action. Finally, we had a set of control treatments without errors. Subjects were informed of the specifics of their treatment (but not the existence of other treatments) in the experimental instructions, which are included in the online appendix.
Realized payoffs
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The stage game is the prisoner's dilemma in Figure 1 where the payoffs are denoted in points. Cooperation and defection take the "benefit/cost" (b/c) form, where cooperation means paying a cost c to give a benefit b to the other player, while defection gives 0 to each party; b/c took the values 1.5 and 4.
3 The expected payoff tables in Figure 1 incorporate the noise probability E=1/8. Subjects were presented with both the b/c representation and the resulting preerror payoff matrix, in neutral language (the choices were labeled A and B as opposed to the "C"
and "D" that is standard in the prisoner's dilemma). We used the exchange rate of 30 units = $1.
Subjects were given a show-up fee of $10 plus their winnings from the repeated prisoner's dilemma. 4 To allow for negative stage-game payoffs, subjects began the session with an "endowment" of 50 units (in addition to the show-up fee). 5 On average subjects made $18 per session, with a range from $11 to $32. Sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes.
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A total of 338 subjects voluntarily participated at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory in Cambridge, MA. In each session, 12-32 subjects interacted anonymously via computer using the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ) in a sequence of infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas (see Table 1 for summary statistics on the different treatments). We conducted a total of 16 sessions between September 2009 and December 2012. 7 (Some of the data in our control treatments were originally reported in Fudenberg et al. (2012) .) We only implemented one treatment during a given session, so each subject participated in only one treatment. To implement random game lengths, we followed the procedure of Dreber et al. (2008) and Fudenberg et al. (2012) , pre-generating a sequence of integers according to the specified geometric distribution to use in all sessions, such that in each session every first interaction lasted periods, every second interaction lasted etc.
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As noted earlier, in the observed-intentions treatment, the highest equilibrium payoffs can be supported with strategies that condition only on intentions and ignore outcomes; moreover, the set of such equilibria is the same as in a game with the same expected payoff matrix and observed actions. Under both of the payoff specifications we used, the observed-intentions game has subgame-perfect equilibria in which both players cooperate each period, including for example the strategy profile where both players use the "Grim" strategy, which is "Play C iff the opponent has never played D". However, Dal Bó (2005) shows that the existence of a cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game without noise is not sufficient for there to be much cooperation, and subsequent work by Blonski et al. (2011) and Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) suggests that a key determinant is whether Grim risk-dominates the strategy "Always Defect" in a 2x2 game. Considering the relevant payoffs, we see that this is the case for both of our payoff specifications. 9 However, in the game with errors and unobserved intentions, when b/c=1.5 the only Nash equilibrium is "Always Defect, " and Fudenberg et al. (2012) found substantially less cooperation with this payoff specification than when b/c=4.
Past experiments on observed intentions in games with errors have only studied one-shot or finitely repeated games. Because these settings do not have a cooperative equilibrium, this work offers little guidance as to whether players will follow the theoretically optimal policy of conditioning only on intentions in the observed-intentions treatment, or on the question of how play in the observed-intentions and no-error infinitely repeated games will compare. Note that although conditioning only on intentions yields the highest equilibrium payoffs, a subject who believes that other subjects will condition on outcomes as well as intentions will find it optimal to do so as well, as may a subject who is uncertain whether others respond to outcomes as well as intentions.
Inspired both by past experimental findings and theoretical concerns, we organize our analysis around the following questions: 
Results
Figure 1. First period cooperation across interactions for each condition and b/c.
Before addressing our main questions of interest, we investigate the extent to which behavior changed over the course of a session as the result of learning. To balance the need for data with the evidence of learning, we focus our analysis on the last four interactions of each session, as in Fudenberg et al. (2012) .
To address Questions 1 and 2, we now examine the aggregate level of cooperation over the last four interactions, as well as the fraction of the time that subjects cooperated in the first period of a new interaction. are not significant, although trending in the same direction (vs. observed-intentions, p=0.14; versus no error, p=0.294).
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no significant difference between observed-intentions and no error (p=0.808). We return to this difference between our results and those of Bereby-Meyer and Roth in the Discussion and Appendix B. 13 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent p-values are generated using logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered on subjects and group, with the p-value being that associated with a treatment dummy.
To answer Questions 3 through 5, we turn from aggregate behavior to considering the particular strategies used by subjects in our experiments. As one way to do this, we use the SFEM of Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) to assign probability weights to a predefined set of strategies. We complement this MLE with descriptive statistics that do not required the choice of a particular strategy set, but instead make assumptions about the general form of strategies employed.
Before addressing the remaining experimental questions in turn, we briefly describe the SFEM of strategy estimation and present its results. We then draw from these results to answer our questions. We will only summarize this method here (see Dal Bó and Frechette 2011 and Fudenberg et al. 2012 for more information). The idea is to restrict attention to a relatively large but finite set S of strategies, and suppose that each subject chooses a fixed element of S in the last 4 interactions, and moreover that regardless of whether there are exogenous errors, subjects make mistakes or "mental errors" when choosing their intended action. These mistakes let us assign a positive likelihood to any history for player and any strategy, and we can then assign an aggregate likelihood to any probability distribution p on S. We estimate p by MLE, and compute the standard errors by bootstrap; Appendix C presents the likelihood function we use.
A key aspect of this approach is choosing the set of strategies S to include in the estimation. Given the available data it is not possible to distinguish all possible strategies, as some histories arise only rarely and infinitely many can never occur at all in any finite sample.
Guided by theoretical considerations and past empirical work we began with a set of 38 of strategies, and then discarded those that did not seem to be present in at least one payoff specification (including the no-error and unobserved-intention controls). Roughly speaking, we started from the strategies that Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2012) found had a non-negligible share in at least one treatment, and added similar ones that condition on both intentions and outcomes. Appendix D lists all of the strategies that were originally included and the procedure for discarding strategies.
Our final strategy set includes 17 strategies, which are described in Table 2 . In addition to describing each strategy, Table 2 also indicates which strategies are lenient, in that they wait for multiple defections to punish, and which are forgiving, in that they are willing to return to cooperating following a breakdown in cooperation. Grim2-I Play C until 2 consecutive periods occur in which either player's intention was D, then play D forever (Lenient) Strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes Tolerant Tit-for-Tat TFT-T Play C unless both partner's intention and action were D last period (Forgiving) Punitive 2-Tits-for-2-Tats 2TF2T-P Play C unless there were 2 consecutive periods out of the last 3 periods in which either the partner's intention or action was D (2 periods of punishment if partner intends or actually plays D twice in a row) (Lenient & forgiving) The probability assigned to these 17 strategies by the SFEM procedure in each of our 6 conditions is shown in Table 3. 14 Only strategies that condition on outcomes are included in the SFEM for the no-error control (because there is no difference between intention and outcome) and in the unobserved-intention control (because intention information was unavailable to the subjects). We now turn to our remaining experimental questions.
QUESTION 3: How close do subjects come to basing their play solely on intentions?
Examining Table 3 , we see that a majority of subjects in the observed-intentions treatments disregard outcomes (i.e. play unconditional strategies or strategies that condition exclusively on intentions): 77% of probability weight at b/c=1.5, 69% of probability weight at b/c=4. Strategies conditioning exclusively on outcomes account for only 4% at b/c=1.5 and 13%
and b/c=4, and strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes account for 19% in each payoff specification.
As an additional way to examine this question, we consider all histories in which the opponent's intent and actual move in the last period differed. In 82% of such cases (b/c=1.5:
84%, b/c=4: 80%), the subject's decision matched the opponent's intent rather than the outcome.
The results are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude subjects who cooperated in fewer than 25% of all decisions: the subject's decision then matched the opponent's intent in the previous period in 85% of cases (b/c=1.5: 85%, b/c=4: 85%).
Thus both the SFEM and the descriptive statistics suggest that a large majority of subjects base their play solely on intentions. We focus our attention on the subset of players who do actually condition on outcomes to answer Question 4.
QUESTION 4: To the extent that subjects condition on realized outcomes as well as intentions in the observed-intentions treatment, how do they do this?
Considering the results in Table 3 , we see that subjects in the two payoff specifications condition on outcomes differently. At b/c=1.5, a non-negligible probability weight (15%) is assigned to the strategy 2TF2T-P. In general, 2TF2T waits for two periods of defection by the partner and then punishes for two periods. The 2TF2T-P variant of 2TF2T is "punitive," in that it uses outcomes to punish an accidental D, but does not use a realization of C to forgive an intended D. That is, these players condition on outcome when the intention was C, but not when the intention was D. At b/c=4, conversely, a non-negligible probability weight (19%) is assigned to the strategy TFT-T (4% of subjects at b/c=1.5 also play TFT-T). This strategy is a variant of TFT that is "tolerant," in that it uses outcomes to forgive would-be defectors who cooperated by accident, but not to punish unintended defections. That is, in contrast to the punitive version of 2TF2T, this tolerant strategy conditions on outcomes when the intention was D, but not when the intention was C.
To complement the SFEM analysis, we use simple descriptive measures that implicitly suppose that subjects ignore observations from two or more periods ago and only condition on observations from the previous period (Figure 3) . Consistent with the MLE results, Figure 3 suggests that at b/c=1.5 subjects are punitive and condition on outcome when the opponent's intention was C, but not when the opponent's intention was D. This visual impression is confirmed by a positive relationship between a player's probability of cooperating and the opponent's actual move last period when the opponent intended to play C at b/c=1.5 (p<0.001).
Again consistent with the SFEM , we see a different pattern at b/c=4; here, subjects are tolerant In addition to asking whether and how subjects used realized outcomes in addition to intentions to guide their play, we are interested in how various strategic features of play with observed intentions compares to that in the no-error and unobserved-intentions controls.
Specifically, we compare the memory length of the strategies used in the three conditions, and the extent to which play is "lenient" in the sense of forgiving the first deviation by an opponent.
Intuitively, the high share of lenient strategies observed in the unobserved-intentions control may correspond to subjects giving their partner the benefit of the doubt that a defection could have occurred by accident, and to combine this sort of leniency with punishment for persistent defections requires strategies to look back more than one period.
17 Table 4 shows the relevant aggregated SFEM frequencies, as well as various descriptive statistics. First we consider the SFEM aggregations. In terms of strategy complexity, we see that the observed-intentions treatments look very similar to the no-error controls: a large majority of cooperative strategies are simple in that they are either unconditional or condition/trigger-based on the previous period only (b/c=1.5: 74% observed-intentions, 75% no error; b/c=4, 81%
observed-intentions, 77% no error). This stands in stark contrast to the unobserved-intentions 16 We find qualitatively equivalent results when, instead of assuming that learning is linear in interaction number, we compare play in the first four interactions with play in the last four interactions. (Interacting a "last 4 interactions" dummy with opponent's actual move finds a non-significant positive coefficient in all cases; b/c=1/5, opponent intended C: p=0.13 without controls, p=0.33 with controls; b/c=4, opponent intended D: p=0.174 without controls, p=0.160 with controls). 17 Fudenberg et al. (2012) also considers the strategic element of 'forgiveness,' or willingness to return to cooperate after punishing a defection. Unlike leniency, there is not a clear a priori prediction about the effect of observing intentions on forgiveness. Thus we do not analyze forgiveness here, but include it in the Appendix F for completeness; where we show that there is not a clear relationship between it and whether intentions are observable.. controls, where the frequency of simple strategies is cut nearly in half (43% at both b/c=1.5 and b/c=4).
Turning to leniency, we see that results vary by payoff specifications. This is not surprising, as leniency itself varies across specifications: As shown in Fudenberg et al. (2012) , leniency is common at higher b/c ratios (such as b/c=4), but relatively rare at the low b/c ratio of 1.5. Thus we would expect that making intentions observable would have a much larger effect at b/c=4 than at b/c=1.5 Consistent with that expectation, at b/c=4, the fraction of cooperative strategies that are lenient in the observed-intentions condition is much more similar to the noerror control than the unobserved-intentions control; whereas at b/c=1.5, the observed-intentions treatment is similar to the unobserved-intentions control, and both are higher than the no-error control.
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We now complement these results with descriptive statistics. For maximum comparability, these measures use intentions in the observed-intentions treatments, and outcomes in the unobserved-intentions and no-error controls. In each case, we measure leniency by examining all histories in which C (either intentional or realized, depending on the measure) occurred in all but the previous period, while in the previous period one subject played D. 19 We then ask how frequently the subject who had hitherto cooperated showed leniency by continuing to cooperate. The results are similar to the SFEM. At b/c=4, leniency in the observed-intentions condition is lower than the unobserved-intentions control, whereas at b/c=1.5, the amount of leniency is similar in observed-intentions and unobserved-intentions.
In sum, we find evidence that in the presence of errors, making intentions observable increases the frequency of cooperative strategies, reduces the complexity of those cooperative strategies, and also reduces the extent of leniency (at least at b/c=4, the specification in which leniency is common when intentions are unobservable).
18 As the fraction of cooperative strategies varies across condition (in particular, at b/c=1.5 the unobserved-intention condition is much lower than the other conditions), we report the fraction of cooperative strategies that are lenient, rather than the fraction of all strategies that are lenient. For completeness, we report the un-normalized values here: b/c-1.5: no-error=7%, observed-intentions=31%, unobserved-intentions=17%; b/c=4: no-error=40%, observedintentions=53%, unobserved-intentions=63%. 19 We also include second round decisions in which the first round's outcome was CD. 
Discussion
We begin by asking how well subjects did in terms of maximizing their payoffs, both overall and by type of strategy used. This provides some insight into which sorts of strategies were (ex post) mistakes, and gives us a rough sense of how close the distribution of play is to an equilibrium-e.g. what percentage of players are receiving close to the best possible payoff given the distribution of play. Table 5 shows the expected payoff of each strategy given the prevalence according to the SFEM . In the observed-intentions treatment at b/c=1.5, the two most prevalent strategies are TFT-I and Grim2-I; these purely intention-based strategies also yield the highest payoff of 5.5.
The punitive 2TF2T-P, which was also somewhat common, did almost as well, but subjects who used it did incur a small loss. The most common poorly performing strategy here is ALLD; this is a common feature of repeated games experiments, and the payoff loss to ALLD is even higher in the no-error control, due to the smaller share of lenient strategies and the increased share of the unforgiving strategy set Grim and its variants. Conversely, ALLD yields the highest payoff in the unobservedintentions control, where it is also the most commonly used strategy. Mistaken extrapolation from that case could help explain the play of ALLD in the observed-intentions treatment, but it is harder to explain the use of ALLD in the no-error control, as this is a simpler learning environment.
At b/c=4, in the observed-intentions treatment most subjects play some sort of conditional cooperation strategy based on intentions or intentions and outcomes; all of these strategies do fairly well, with most of them earning payoffs not statistically different from the highest performing strategy. In particular the expected payoff of the tolerant strategy TFT-T is statistically indistinguishable from that of TFT-I. Once again, the most common "mistake" is to play ALLD, which yields a payoff of about 19 versus the high-30's payoffs obtained with conditional cooperation.
We conclude that a high fraction of the subjects do quite well. As in past work, the biggest mistake is the use of ALLD. Subjects who do condition on outcomes as well as intentions do so at essentially no cost when b/c=4, and at only a slight cost when b/c=1.5. This slightly costly punitive behavior at b/c=1.5 could be the result of other-regarding preferences: an inequity averse player might punish an accidental defection (and pay the cost of potentially derailing the cooperative relationship) in order to avoid earning less than the opponent. The cost of such a punishment increases dramatically with the returns to cooperation, explaining the lower level of punitive play at b/c=4.
We found that learning is significantly slower in the unobserved-intentions control compared to the no-error control, but that learning is equally fast in the no-error control and the intentions-observed treatment. This latter fact contrasts with the finding of Bereby-Meyer and Roth, who found that adding a stochastic shock to payoffs (as opposed to actions) resulted in slower learning. One possible explanation may be that when an error occurred in our setup, both players' payoffs were altered, whereas in their setup, the two players' probabilistic lottery payoff draws were independent (i.e. payoff shocks are correlated across players in our setting but independent in theirs). Also, either for this reason, or because of the way the games our framed, our procedure may speed learning because it focuses attention on the opponent's intentions, which are what subjects need to be learning about.
To directly test this latter possibility, we ran a follow-up experiment on Mechanical Turk (Horton et al. 2011), recruiting 96 subjects and randomizing them into one of two ways to explain the structure of the random errors, the "Error" and "Lottery" conditions. In both conditions, subjects were told the payoff structure of our b/c=4 Observed-intentions PD. Then they were told to imagine the other player had chosen C and the low-probability D outcome had occurred, and asked to what extent they thought the other person intended to pay 0 cents and give 0 cents (i.e. had intended the D outcome) using a 7-point Likert scale (1="Do not intend it at all" to 7="completely intended it").
In the Error condition, the probabilistic mechanism was explained with the same language as in our Observed-intentions condition. "There is a 7/8 probability that the move you As predicted, we found that subjects in the Error condition thought that the [0,0] outcome was significantly less intentional compared to subjects in the Lottery outcome (Mean intentionality ratings: Error: 2.27, Lottery: 3.33; Rank-sum, p=0.036; Tobit regression with robust standard errors and controls for age, gender and education: p=0.009). This supports our hypothesis that framing noise as execution errors emphasizes the 'accidental' nature of bad outcomes relative to framing noise as a lottery. Put differently, the execution error framing decreases subjects' sense of 'causal control' (Cushman et al. 2009 ) relative to the lottery framing, in that the error frame makes it seem as though some other agent (the computer) is causing the bad outcome, rather than the player. 21 We conjecture that this increased the subjects' ability to focus on the intended good outcome and that this is why learning proceeded more quickly.
We also see that subjects use simpler, lower-memory strategies with observed intentions than when intentions are not observed. This suggests that the more complex strategies found in the unobserved-intentions condition use longer memory in part as a way to attempt to learn and track the intentions of other subjects. This is particularly true for b/c=4, where there is a high return to cooperation, and long memory lenient cooperative strategies were most prevalent with unobserved intentions.
To further investigate strategic complexity, we examine how response times vary with play and condition. As in Rand et al (2012) , we see that faster decisions are more cooperative (p<0.001) 22 . Considering variation by condition, we would predict based on the complexity of the decision setting that decision times should be fastest in the no-error control, slowest in the 20 See Appendix G for the full instructions. 21 See also Bolton et al. (2005) who explore procedural fairness versus outcome fairness. 22 Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, considering the last four interactions. Log-10 transformed response time is taken as the independent variable, and controls for condition (dummies for observed-intention, no-error or unobserved-intention), b/c, interaction number and period number are included. Decision times are log-10 transformed as in Rand et al 2012 to account for the heavily skewed nature of the response time distributions. Equivalent results are found when using untransformed response times, when including all interactions, or both.
unobserved-intentions control, and intermediate with observed intentions. When we examine the data, we see that the decision times conform to this prediction when b/c=4. 23 However, when b/c=1.5, decision time is longest in the observed-intentions treatment.
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We also see interesting differences across conditions in learning: In the no-error and observed-intentions conditions, decision times decrease with interaction (p<0.001 for both), as we would expect; but with unobserved intentions, decision times actually increase with interaction (p<0.001). 25 Further investigation of this increasing response time in the unobservedintentions condition finds a significant negative interaction between interaction number and subjects' overall frequency of cooperation when predicting response time (p<0.001) 26 : the less often a subject cooperated overall, the more her response time tended to increase with experience (controlling for whether the current decision was C or D). As a result, regressing decision time against interaction number finds no significant relationship when only examining subjects who were largely cooperative (i.e. cooperated in more than 2/3 of all decisions, p=0.890).
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We do not have a theoretical explanation for all of the response time data, but we feel that the connection between response time and choice of strategy, and how this varies with the strategic environment, is an interesting topics for that merits future study
Our data shows that while subjects focus primarily on intentions, outcomes can matter too. To further understand when and how subjects rely on intentions versus outcomes, we also ran a series of repeated ultimatum games, where the proposer had only two possible offers (an 23 0.144; 0.185; 0. 263. An equivalent ordering is obtained when controlling for interaction, period, and whether the decision was C or D. 24 0.294; 0.224; 0. 235. An equivalent ordering is obtained when controlling for interaction, period, and whether the decision was C or D, except that the very similar response times of observed-intentions and unobserved-intentions flip. 25 Linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, taking log10(response time) as the DV, interaction as the IV, and including controls for b/c, period and whether the decision was C or D. 26 Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, considering the unobservedintentions condition, taking log10(response time) as the DV, interaction number and frequency of cooperation over all decisions as the IVs, and including an interaction between these two terms as well as controls for b/c, period and whether the decision was C or D. The negative interaction between interaction number and frequency of cooperation over all decisions remains significant (p=0.001) when controlling for the period 1 intention of the partner in the previous interaction and current partner's action in the previous period. 27 The cutoff of 2/3 was determined by testing at which frequency of overall cooperation the net coefficient on interaction number became non-significant. P-value reflects linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, considering the unobserved-intentions condition, taking log10(response time) as the DV, interaction number and frequency of cooperation over all decisions as the IVs, and controls for b/c, period and whether the decision was C or D. We continue to find no effect among subjects who cooperated in more than 2/3 of decisions when also controlling for the period 1 intention of the partner in the previous interaction and current partner's action in the previous period (p=0.192).
equal split and a selfish one), the chosen offer was proposed with probability 7/8, and the player 2's observed both the intended offer and the realized one. (The details of this experiment are in Appendix A.) This is a repeated game and so has equilibria in which players condition their actions on observations from past periods. 28 There is indeed some evidence of conditioning on past period: When faced with either an intentional or accidental unfair offer, P2s were more likely to accept if P1 intended A in the previous period. Regardless of P1's previous play, however, the treatment of conflicting intentions and outcomes looked qualitatively similar: play was largely tolerant, in that only intentional low offers were consistently rejected. 29 Thus our repeated ultimatum game experiment provides further evidence of the use of tolerant strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes, as was suggested in the b/c=4 observedintentions treatment of our main experiment.
Finally, here we have looked at two limiting cases: completely unobservable intentions versus perfectly observable intentions. However, in most real-world settings, observability will probably be somewhere in between -intentions will be imperfectly observable. We might expect people to pay more attention to outcomes in such partial-observability settings as outcomes contain some information about intentions.
Conclusion
We conclude that making intentions observable allows subjects to achieve the same level of cooperation under errors as if errors were not present, because subjects largely ignore outcomes and condition only on intentions. This finding is consistent with the predictions of theory in the sense that the highest payoff equilibrium ignores outcomes. Moreover, intentionbased strategies are both common and earn high payoffs given the observed distribution of play.
Thus institutions that increase the observability of intentions may help to mitigate the negative consequences of errors: when your aim is true, accidents will by and large be forgiven and forgotten. 28 For example there is an equilibrium in which Player 2s condition only on intentions and use the following strategy: "Accept when Player 1 intended the equal split; reject when he intended the selfish one, as long as I have always done so in the past, and otherwise always accept." 29 Intentional and accidental fair offers were accepted 100% of the time. Accidental low offers were accepted 88% of the time if P1 intended to make a fair offer in the previous period and 67% of the time if not. Purposeful low offers were accepted 17% of the time if P1 intended to make a fair offer in the previous period and 7% of the time if not.
Appendix A: Repeated UG
In our repeated UG experiments, 68 subjects were randomly assigned to be either Player We find some evidence of learning: the probability of P1 choosing the fair offer A increases over interaction (period 1: p=0.011; all periods, p<0.001), as does the probability of P2 rejecting accidental unfair offers ("Accept A-B" in Fig A1; period 1: p=0.008; all periods, p=0.002) (all other accept probabilities p>0.20). Thus we follow the main text PD analysis and focus on the last four interactions in our subsequent analyses.
We now consider the choices of the 34 P2s individually. We find that 30 We used an exchange rate of 30 units = $1.
• 70.6% of subjects (N=24) condition on both intentions and outcomes and are tolerant (i.e.
reject in more than 95% of cases where both P1's intention and the outcome were B, accept in more than 95% of cases otherwise).
• 14.7% of subjects (N=5) accept in 95% of cases or more regardless of P1's intention and outcome)
• 8.8% of subjects (N=3) condition on outcomes only, (i.e. reject in >95% of cases where the outcome was B regardless of P1's intention, and accept in >95% of the cases where the outcome was A regardless of P1's intention)
• 5.9% of subjects (N=2) were not easily classified, having acceptance probabilities >5% but less than 95% in one or more cases.
We also examine whether P2s condition their play on P1's intention in the previous period. In the last four interactions, no P2 ever rejected a fair offer, either intentional (A-A) or accidental (B-A). Considering unfair offers, however, we do find a significant effect of P1's intended offer in the previous period 31 : Both for accidental low offers (A-B, p=0.009) and purposeful low offers (B-B, p=0.004), P2s were more likely to accept if P1 intended A in the previous period, as shown in Figure A2 . Regardless of P1's intention in the previous period, however, we see a large amount of tolerance (i.e. good outcomes are used to forgive bad intentions much more than bad outcomes are used to punish good intentions). In sum, our repeated UG experiment provides further evidence of the use of tolerant strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes, as was suggested in the b/c=4
observed-intentions treatment of our main experiment.
Appendix B: Re-analysis of learning in Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006)
Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) compare learning rates in finitely repeated games where payoffs are either deterministic or probabilistic. 32 They have also include a 'Sun-spots' control in which payoffs are deterministic, but players are also presented with the outcome of two random lotteries (that do not effect payoffs) each turn. They conclude that learning to cooperate in period 1 occurs more slowly in the probabilistic condition than in either the deterministic or sun-spot conditions. As the main text explains, they used a different analysis strategy. Instead of regressing first period cooperation against interaction number, Bereby-Meyer and Roth compared just the first and the last interaction (note that BMR refer to interactions as 'supergames'). This difference in methods did not change the analysis of our data.
Now, we re-analyze their data using our learning metric: comparing the coefficient for interaction number when predicting first period cooperation across conditions. 33 Doing so, we also find that there is significantly slower learning when payoffs are probabilistic compared to deterministic in a repeated game (condition X interaction: coeff = 0.120, p<0.001), but we do not find a significant difference in learning speed between their probabilistic condition and their sunspot control (coeff = 0.032, p=0.224). As can be seen in Figure B1 , cooperation in the sun-spot control climbs rapidly in supergames 2 and 3, but then stabilizes. 32 They also study one-shot games. 33 As in the main text, we use logistic regression with standard errors clustered on subject and group.
If we restrict our re-analysis to interactions 1 and 20 (as in their original analysis), we replicate their result: significantly more change from interaction 1 to 20 in both the deterministic (p=0.006) and the sun-spot (p=0.005) conditions compared to the probabilistic condition. These two methods of analysis give different results in the sun-spots condition because most of the learning there occurs in the first three interactions; regressing over all interactions shows relatively little change in first period cooperation per interaction, despite that fact that first period cooperation increases substantially from the first interactions to the last.
Overall, it seems that the noise in Bereby-Meyer and Roth had a substantially different effect on learning than the shocks to actions in our experiments. One possible explanation is that the noise in their probabilistic condition psychologically feels quite different from how we introduce noise. 34 . Although these two processes are mathematically equivalent, our procedure places more emphasis on the role of intentions: it makes it feel like the other person didn't mean to choose the outcome in cases were errors occur. In BMR's setup, although the players do not have direct control over the outcomes, it may not feel to the opponent that the randomness of lottery is changing the actor's intent. As discussed in the main text, we explore this possibility with an additional experiment.
This table shows the results of a first MLE with all 38 possible strategies. Next we performed a second estimation including only strategies that had weight great than 0.05 in at least one condition. For our final MLE shown in the main text, we then included only the strategies that were present at p<0.10 in at least one condition in the second MLE. Table E1 . Cooperation as a function of opponent's actual move in the previous period.
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